Private transfers
A transfer stays between the two wallets. You see what left. The receiver sees what arrived when that wallet is opened. The amount, the names, the balances, and how much has moved stay with those two. There is no fee. Every transfer is closed the same way.
The amount sits in a note closed for those two wallets, with the same three locks and the same encryption as a message: X25519, ML-KEM-768, and HQC-192. The amount stays closed as long as one lock holds. The receiver's address is how the note is closed. The transfer does not name who received the coins. You can attach a short invoice, up to 64 characters, in that same note. The receiver reads it with the amount. You know the number you attached, so the two of you can match the transfer later. The invoice stays in the note.
A separate spend check, BHS3, shows the coins are real without putting the amount in the public inputs. That check is not a third-party audit.
Private text
BHR Text is the most secure chat platform known to the public.
No email. No phone number. No location. No personal details. We keep you unnamed on purpose.
The app password is set once. Refresh at the top updates BHR. It does not log you out. Log out is the lock. The wallet password is what opens the 48 words. Change the wallet password from time to time. If you lose that password or the 48 words, this address cannot be opened again. There is no reset.
A message is closed with three different locks at once. The first is X25519, the lock Signal built on. The second is ML-KEM-768, the post-quantum lock Signal added, and the one browsers use. The third is HQC-192, the extra post-quantum lock NIST picked as a backup beside ML-KEM, from a different kind of math. Public apps added one quantum lock next to X25519. We run all three. Your wallet must use all three secret keys together to read it. A thief who breaks only one kind still cannot read it. They would have to break all three. We can add another lock later the same way. We do not take one away. The first 1:1 line is that three-lock box on the chain. Later short 1:1 lines ride a session ratchet on the same chain, a Double Ratchet plus a fresh X-Wing lock every 64 texts, so a stolen session can heal. That is not Signal's Triple Ratchet. A restore still opens every three-lock line. Session cells need this wallet on this device.
The words never sit on the public chain. Relays hold the closed box until the keep timer ends, or until you delete it for both. Then this node seals that body with a throwaway key, wipes the key, overwrites the same file in place, and unlinks it. It does not go to a recycle bin. A tombstone stops the blob coming back. A copy you already saved can still open. A miner finds the block. A sealer stamps a fingerprint of that box. If someone swaps the box, the fingerprint fails. Miners, sealers, and relays never receive the secret keys. They only see a closed box and a fingerprint. That is why they cannot read the words. Save those boxes. Bring a quantum computer. The first lock can fall. The other two are a different kind of math. We welcome the test.
This is not a company inbox. There is no central office that has to stay open. Sealed boxes live on miners and sealers. They are paid from the block they mine and stamp, the same way Bitcoin stays up because people are paid to run it. Hold a little BHR. The mint pays that work. A text fee can be zero. The network does not go down because one person turned off a server.
The public locks live in the receive address you share. That address is 11,537 characters because those three locks are large. Those characters are the locks, not filler. A sender copies them and uses them to make three secrets, then mixes those secrets into one key. The lock bytes from the address go into that mix. XChaCha20-Poly1305 then closes the words with that 256-bit key. There are more than 10^77 possible keys for that last door. A machine guessing a billion billion keys a second would still be looking for far longer than the age of the universe. A quantum search of that last door still has more than 10^38 tries. That is still not a practical job, and that guess only starts after all three locks have already fallen. Change one letter or number in the address, or one bit in the sealed box, and the mix does not match. Nothing readable comes out.
The secret keys stay sealed on this device until you type the wallet password you chose at sign up. The 48 words plus that same password can rebuild those keys on another device. The 48 words alone cannot. The app password only opens BHR on this device. It is not the wallet password. Those two passwords must never be the same. If they match, that protection is gone.
This device does not save the words of a chat. It does not write them into a folder. After the wallet password is accepted, it pulls the closed boxes from relays and checks the fingerprint on the chain, then opens only the lines that belong to this wallet. Opening a line means the wallet uses your three secret keys on that closed box, makes the same three secrets the sender mixed, and unlocks the words on screen. A file you already downloaded stays on this device. That is the exception.
The chain can still show that a sealed text moved. That is a fingerprint and an index, not the words, not your name, not who you spoke to. It is there while the blob is on a relay, and the index can remain after the blob is dropped. That is not a leak of the chat. It is the public proof that a closed box was stamped so it could not be swapped.
The long address
Share the address. Anyone with it can send you BHR or a message. The secrets that open the wallet are not in that string. The address is how people reach you. What you hold stays off public eyes.
The address is 11,537 characters on purpose. Those characters are the three public locks a sender uses to mix one seal: X25519, ML-KEM-768, and HQC-192. The lock bytes from the address go into that mix. It starts with BHR. The next 11,470 characters are the public locks. The last 64 are the spend id. X25519 is 64 characters. ML-KEM-768 is 2,368. HQC-192 is 9,028. Ten characters mark the version and the length of each key. HQC-192 is the extra lock, and it is most of the address. Paste the whole address. Change one letter or number and the mix is wrong. A short paste cannot receive.
Add a username when you want a short way to find the same address. On this device, type the name and press Check. Save contact file writes the username and the full address into one file. Give that file to the other person. They add it, and Check matches the name to the address. You share the address yourself. The username stays on the devices that saved it. The full address works on its own.
Copy address copies all 11,537 characters. Paste the whole string. A full paste can receive. A partial paste is missing part of a lock and cannot receive. The address id under Your wallet ids is a different 64 characters. It checks that you opened the right wallet. Use the long address to receive.
